



**Fire Brigades Union
Tayside**

**Making
Tayside
Safer**

**Response to the
2007/08 IRMP
Consultation Document**

FIRE BRIGADES UNION TAYSIDE



INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE TAYSIDE FIRE BOARD 2007/08 IRMP CONSULTATION DOCUMENT

**"TOWARDS A SAFER
TAYSIDE"**

Index and Glossary

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Glossary

AFA	Automatic Fire Alarm
ALP	Aerial Ladder Platform (high reach rescue appliance)
CAST	Critical Attendance Standard
CFS	Community Fire Safety
DCLG	Department of Communities & Local Government
F & R	Fire and Rescue
H & S	Health and Safety
PDA	Pre-Determined Attendance
IRMP	Integrated Risk Management Planning
UFS	Unwanted Fire Signal

Executive Summary

The Fire Brigades Union once again welcomes an opportunity to discuss the future of the fire and rescue services we provide to the community. As an organisation we have been at the vanguard of the move to risk based fire cover and remain convinced that this is the correct way to allocate limited resources. It is therefore disappointing to be reviewing the Tayside Fire and Rescue Boards 2007/08 IRMP document and find it ***inadequate, big on buzz words and corporate jargon but bereft of detail, short on information and lacking in vision.***

Would any of these possible changes result in a safer Tayside? Without firm proposals, evidence, or information it is completely impossible to say.

Tayside F&R seem to misunderstand the concept of consultation on an evidence based proposal.

The adoption of risk based response over the previous prescriptive standards of fire cover should have seen those previous standards as a minimum. Improvements however would still have been required to overcome the continuation of the two-tier service approach based on geographic location. ***It is our opinion that the inequality in response times laid down between the city and the county is unacceptable.*** Rather than address this issue the service changes the organisations 'Performance Indicators', therefore eliminating comparison.

Areas of concern that professional firefighters have consistently raised are not discussed and rather than debate the difficult issues, Tayside Fire Board have chosen to disregard those topics and the anxieties of the community, so issues such as fire cover in Perth and Angus are completely ignored. Also ignored are the expansion of the service role in relation to Road Traffic Accidents and the development of the Fire Brigade into a "rescue service". No mention is made of the substantial contribution Tayside is making to the Scotland wide New Dimensions project, and the fact that local tax payers are subsidising this project for the Scottish Executive. ***By dismissing these genuine concerns Tayside Fire Board will be disregarding the very people who elect them.***

In spite of the fact that the IRMP process is supposed to provide local solutions to local problems, the level of external influence should not be underestimated. We have seen direct and indirect manipulation of IRMP's within other Scottish fire & rescue services. It remains our hope that Tayside resists these pressures and appreciates that ***the public expects honest and integrity from its services. That honesty and integrity should extend to giving them genuine opportunity to comment on proposals that affect them.***

What is Integrated Risk Management Planning (IRMP)?

- IRMP is a process by which fire brigades can devise appropriate responses to local requirements based on risk.
- The emphasis is to save life.
- Used properly it is possible to make our community safer.
- Used incorrectly it will cost lives!

Integrated Risk Management means integrating prevention, protection and intervention strategies in order to reduce the risk to the public.

• **Prevention** - stop fires before they start and as far as possible prevent other emergencies from occurring. Education is the key – for fire prevention a Home Fire Risk Audit can be carried out to assist the public.

• **Protection** - in buildings covered by Fire Safety Legislation – stop fires before they start, give early warning of fire through automatic fire detection equipment, and limit fire spread through building design and building management so that people can get out safely if a fire does start.

In residential premises including dwellings – give early warning of fires if they do start (e.g. smoke detectors), limit fire spread (sprinklers) coupled with Fire Escape Plans (what to do if a fire starts in your home to maximise your chances of escape/rescue).

• **Intervention** - have the correct level of emergency resources (firefighters/ emergency fire control operators / fire engines etc.) available to deal with fires (and other emergencies) when they do occur.

Effective Community Risk Management requires robust balance of Prevention, Protection and Intervention strategies in order that the maximum number of lives can be saved, and injuries and property loss significantly reduced.


The truly integrated risk management plan will aim to improve standards in all areas of service activity.



The Intervention Window

Throughout the discussion of IRMP there is one central factor - the intervention window - and how it impacts on the chances of survival.

It is vital to understand this concept (illustrated below)



The Correct Approach

It is important to avoid falling into the trap of viewing Integrated Risk Management Plans as no more than resource management strategies, with resources being switched from one area of activity to another, or resources being cut to save money, without any **clear evidence of consequential benefits to community safety**.

Before any changes are proposed or implemented in the area of intervention as a result of proposals to alter activity in the areas of prevention and/or protection, the outcomes of such additional activity must clearly demonstrate proven and sustainable long-term improvements in both employee safety and the safety of the communities that we serve.

Installation of Domestic Smoke Alarms

It should be noted that whilst the FBU remains supportive of attempts to increase the usage of domestic smoke detectors, these **smoke alarms themselves are not a prevention measure**. In fact in 67% of fire incidents with casualties in Tayside the dwellings had smoke detectors fitted. (Scottish Executive Statistical Bulletin Fire Statistics 2003)

If someone is unfortunate enough to have a smoke alarm activate it means that the prevention initiatives have failed and that they are likely to require the intervention resources of their local fire brigade. Domestic smoke alarms are however a vital component of the "Intervention Window". By raising the alarm at the earliest opportunity the occupants can place a 999 call sooner, also, reducing the handling time of the call by utilizing local command and control operators allows a speedier mobilization of fire appliances. Reducing the time taken to receive and handle the first call, combined with a speedy and properly resourced attendance by firefighters increases the chances of survival.

The holistic approach to reducing fire deaths includes prevention measures such as education, identifying high risks and formulating a strategy to target these. Combined with Protection measures which can assist in increasing the use of smoke detectors, sprinklers and emergency escape plans. **These however can only be effective when combined with properly resourced fire controls and fully crewed fire appliances that are available to react quickly and effectively.**

The Fire Brigades Union is fully supportive of this holistic approach to reducing fire death and injury.



Home Office statistics on fire death in relation to response times are included in appendix 1

Non Fire Emergencies

The FBU notes with disappointment that no proposals are made in relation to dealing with specific non-fire emergencies such as water rescues and rescues from height. Both are areas where FBU members are active in attempting to enhance the capabilities of the service and yet we have no suggestions as to how these skills can be utilised. FBU officials have on a number of occasions called for management to develop a strategy in relation to these specialist tasks, but ***continue to be frustrated by the lack of any policy in this area.***

In order to comply with legislation relating to working at height TF&R have been active in training firefighters to work with new equipment and techniques involving ropes and harnesses. Always at the forefront of safety within the service, the FBU is pleased that this work has begun but is sceptical that the appropriate levels of training, instruction and supervision can be maintained in line with the current levels of commitment. Additionally these techniques require a level of expertise best provided by smaller numbers of highly trained specialists. (Fire Service Training Manual Volume 4). Having acquired and developed the skills required to deploy these techniques ***the FBU are surprised that no strategy for utilising these to meet the additional functions of the Fire (Scotland) Act have been forthcoming*** from the service.

Similarly the subject of rescues from water is once again ignored. Despite the fact that on a regular basis firefighters are mobilised to this type of incident without proper equipment, protection or training. The FBU is extremely concerned that Tayside Fire Board are knowingly placing their employees into potentially dangerous situations without proper reference to their health & safety. Time after time personnel are committed to water incidents wearing uniforms designed for fire fighting, without life jackets, with no equipment and with absolutely no training. ***The current situation is intolerable and it is only a matter of time before tragedy strikes.***

The view of professional firefighters in Tayside is that specialist teams should be established to deal with incidents involving rescues from height and rescues from water.

Road Traffic Accidents

The IRMP document allots one paragraph of introductory text and one graph to this topic, none of which indicates any strategy for future commitment or any proposals to improve service response or suggestions for reducing numbers of incidents. Having pointed out this omission in last years IRMP document we are disappointed that no effort has been made to give this area of operations the attention it deserves. Especially as this now forms one of the three 'Core Functions' of the fire & rescue services in Scotland. The scale of this omission cannot be overstated and as a result ***the 2007/08 IRMP document is fundamentally flawed.***

Given that attending RTA's does now form part of the those core functions - along with attending fires and fire safety – it is disappointing to note that the mobilising protocols remain as per pre Fire Act. The F&R service will normally only be mobilised when a person is reported to be trapped following a collision. Usually incurring a delay in attendance as other services tend to be on scene before mobilising the Fire & Rescue Service. The FBU are calling on Tayside Fire Board to expand the type of incidents the fire & rescue service will attend by acting ***in partnership with local police forces to ensure an efficient and robust mobilising policy.*** Given the range of skills possessed by firefighters and the assistance that can be offered to other agencies, including the police, there is no reason why the fire service should not be mobilised to all reported RTA's.

Tayside Fire & Rescue have recently been working in partnership with other agencies and the City of Dundee Council to promote the "Safe Drive – Stay Alive" campaign aimed at secondary school pupils. Having raised this matter with principle managers some years ago we are delighted now that the first steps have been taken to promote this project. ***We hope that Angus Council and Perth & Kinross Council will follow suit and establish the programme in the schools in their areas.***

The view of professional firefighters in Tayside is that the Fire & Rescue service should, be automatically mobilised to all reported road traffic accidents.

The view of professional firefighters in Tayside is that the "Safe Drive Stay Alive" campaign should be extended across all three local authority areas

Perth

The former standards of fire cover allowed for an anomaly that meant only the first call to a fire station was counted towards it meeting its attendance time standard. With the move to Integrated Risk Management this anomaly has been removed. Consequently the resources required to meet the risk should apply whenever that risk is relevant. If for example Perth requires 2 pumping appliances and these get mobilised to an incident they should be replaced by two pumping appliances mobilised to stand-by.

At present if Perth's pumping appliances are turned out a stand-by appliance is sent from Dundee. Dundee can cover its risk resources because the available appliances can generally provide overlapping cover between stations. With only one station in Perth the provided back-up is approximately 30 minutes away. Stand-by appliances must travel at road speed and cannot use 'blue lights'. The time between Perth fire engines being mobilised and the stand-by arriving in the town, means that during this delay Perth has no fire cover. ***Taken over a year Perth may be without fire cover for up to two weeks.***

The above scenario happens on a regular and frequent basis. By not addressing this obvious void in fire cover Tayside Fire Board are deliberately ***placing the residents of Perth at an increased risk.*** Should an incident occur other units could be mobilised but they will have to attend from Auchterarder, Coupar Angus or Dunkeld, all of which are retained stations. This requires personnel to attend from their homes or work, get to the local fire station then drive the appliance to Perth. This ***delay puts residents at greater risk because of the absence of any firefighting resource within Perth.***

If Tayside Fire Board believes in the principle of IRMP they must take note of this gap in risk cover. The Fire Brigades Union believe there is an opportunity to provide an increase in the resource establishment within Perth by providing a third pumping appliance. The appliance and crew would be available to undertake a full range of duties within the town of Perth but also could be utilised to undertake community fire safety work within a radius of Perth that extends the current working area. They would however be available to provide fire cover whenever required.

The view of professional firefighters in Tayside is that an additional pumping appliance is required in Perth.

Further detail is included in supplementary response number 1

Angus

Fire does not comply with rules set by others. It pays no heed to location, property value, social bearing, whether a premise is bought or rented, new or old. Fire can and does strike across all sectors of the community and in all areas of the region.

It is fundamentally wrong that an individual, if unfortunate enough to experience a fire, have their chances of survival determined by the cost of providing adequate resources.

Rural communities must demand improvements in the intervention commitment from Tayside Fire Board. **No amount of fire safety can replace a fire engine when ones property is burning.** The Fire Brigades Union will continue to campaign for improvements in the provision of risk based fire cover for rural areas.

It is a natural result of the deployment of fire engines, that those areas with the higher fire cover also have the higher availability of fire prevention strategies, these being developed and carried out by fire crews. The areas with the least fire cover or with fire crews only available part-time should if using "Integrated Risk Management" be most suitable for increased fire prevention initiatives. **However this holistic approach is lacking in the Tayside Fire Board document.**

Similar to the case for Perth above, we believe there is good argument for the provision of an additional pumping appliance positioned to cover Angus. Based at Forfar and supporting the current retained crews, this appliance could be provided using a combination of whole-time or part-time duty systems. The appliance and crew would be available to undertake a full range of duties within the area around Forfar but also could be utilised to undertake community fire safety work throughout Angus.

The view of professional firefighters in Tayside is that an additional pumping appliance is required in Angus.

Further detail is included in supplementary response number 2.

New Dimension and Urban Search And Rescue

It is clear that the Scottish equivalent to the New Dimensions project is fundamentally flawed. The divergence from the UK model means that Scotland despite being issued with some equipment has no-one trained to the standard expected in England available to utilise it. Those firefighters who have received training are expected to maintain their competence with highly technical and involved procedures and equipment whilst also carrying out the normal duties expected of a firefighter. ***They – through no fault of their own - quite simply cannot acquire, develop and maintain USAR skills that match individuals whose entire training regime is USAR based.***

Across Scotland personnel have been selected for training on the New Dimensions equipment using no specific criteria or specification. Most have been automatically trained because they – by default – were posted to a certain station that was selected to run with the new equipment. No account has been taken of the nature of the tasks likely to be undertaken or the physical and psychological impact they will have. ***No significance has been placed on the fact that personnel may be required to work outside their normal service boundary*** or may be required to remain at an incident for protracted periods.

The idea that a single self contained unit can be replicated a number of times across a country in order to provide strategically placed, standard resources does not equate to what is on the ground today in Scotland. Different transport systems, differing equipment, different levels of training and numbers of personnel available, different means of delivering equipment ***all add up to a disjointed and confused picture across Scotland.*** Misunderstanding on how resources could be requested, what is available and in what time span combine to make the work of the requesting F&R service more difficult rather than removing some of the burden.

Even without a terror threat there is enough experience to know that building collapses - and there are a number of examples of tenement collapse etc - major transport accidents and other natural occurrences require skills and techniques that are outwith the normal remit of the Fire & Rescue service. These tasks are the very reasoning behind USAR and the New Dimension project.

South of the border the Department of Communities & Local Government centrally fund the New Dimensions project, providing personnel, facilities, appliances, equipment and training. A small number of F&R services were selected to host these centrally provided units. Locally, Tayside Fire Board has committed considerable time, effort and money to provide a commitment to this project and that means that ***the taxpayers of Tayside have subsidised the Scottish Executive to the extent of many hundreds of thousands of pounds.***

The view of professional firefighters in Tayside is that specialist USAR teams should be established strategically throughout Scotland, in line with the UK model and that the funding for these units should be available centrally.

Performance

The FBU has no objection to any increase in the number of criteria the brigade uses to measure its performance, however there are certain 'Performance Indicators' that are essential for an emergency service. It is vital that the public continues to have confidence in the level of service Tayside Fire & Rescue delivers, and considering that very few will in reality experience that service first hand, they must rely on key pieces of information on which to base their assumptions. The most fundamental information in the assessment of the fire service is, ***"how long will I have to wait for a fire engine?"***

In order to answer the question above and therefore safeguard public confidence in the service the indicators, ***'Emergency Call Handling Times' and 'Fire Engine Response Times', must be available.***

It would also be reasonable to expect persons to want to know how successful the brigade was at preserving life. So the indicator 'Fire Casualty Rate' must remain.

Similarly it may be reasonable for householders in the region to expect a 'Number of Accidental House Fires' indicator to be present.

It is all very well listing the many performance indicators, but there must be an opportunity for members of the public to view the results. In the 2007/08 consultation document there is no reference back to results of 2006/07 document. ***Without such a reference how do consultees know that the proposals will make a positive impact.***

The Tayside Fire Board IRMP states that they will, "Investigate methods of quantifying the benefits of our legislative and community safety activities." To be three years into a new method of working and only now propose 'investigating' a method of finding out if what you are doing actually works is beyond belief.

The view of professional firefighters in Tayside is that a robust and transparent method of measuring the service performance should be available and accessible to the public in the IRMP document.

Conclusion

As has been stated throughout this and other documents the Fire Brigades Union is supportive of fire safety initiatives. The many and varied innovative programmes for community fire safety are devised by FBU members. However ***increases in community fire safety commitment should be additional to brigade's intervention establishment.***

Whilst persons continue to die in fire, be injured in fire, be rescued from fire or have property destroyed by fire, ***it is simply immoral and unjustifiable to reduce the level of fire cover in order to provide firefighters to fill CFS posts.***

The track record in Scotland for citizens heading government advice is not good. Many high profile campaigns with budgets well in excess of anything fire brigades can contribute have failed. Healthy eating, drink driving and smoking are just three examples that suggest that there is a foreseeable risk that community fire safety campaigns will not have the dramatic impact that would be needed to justifiably reduce the level of fire brigade intervention commitment.

Therefore ***the only conclusion that can be reached is that CFS should be supported but not at the detriment of fire brigade intervention capabilities.***

Our primary concern is that the document under discussion, does not relate any proposal to the objective using evidence. It is insufficient to state that a measure will improve community safety without even indicating the process by which that assumption can be verified. Put simply the document "Towards a Safer Tayside" is simply a list of unqualified notions with no indication of evidence to support them and no resource implications considered.

Within the document many of the ideas could be worthwhile, but ***as a consultation document it fails as it is impossible to critique.*** One cannot argue that any single suggestion has merit or otherwise as there is no indication as to how the suggestion was arrived at, what evidence is available to support it and how success would be measured.

The IRMP document has used various charts and diagrams to illustrate a number of key points. By varying the format of these graphs from the previous years IRMP document it makes comparison impossible. Whether or not this is to deliberately disguise statistics it does give the impression that there is a fear of year on year comparison. Ironically the one table that allows easy comparison is 'Fire Fatalities', which shows the increase to 7 deaths in 2005/06, the third consecutive rise. ***If Tayside F&R are confident in their proposals they should be prepared to produce clear evidence on which real discussion could take place.***

The Fire Brigades Union will continue to offer to work with the Board and the Brigade in order to further the goal of community safety. However there must be a resilient method of comparing changes made, particularly in relation to the standards of fire cover, with the existing regime. The FBU will campaign to **retain the key performance indicators.**

With the emphasis now being placed on saving life, it is important to appreciate that a life has the same value, wherever it may be located throughout the Brigades area. The FBU **will be looking for marked improvements in the provision of service to key areas in Tayside, including enhanced cover for Perth, Angus and rural Perthshire.**

If Tayside Fire Board genuinely desires to provide a fire and rescue service it **most develop a strategic approach to widening the rescue capabilities of the service.** The emphasis in this IRMP document seems to be more focussed on corporate identity and business branding. It should be borne in mind that we do not manufacture tins of cola or compete in a high street but instead do provide an emergency service the public are proud of, it should not be tarnished by cheap marketing speak.

Given that the stated aim of the Fire Board is to make communities safer, the FBU would urge them to set a goal for this task. One that whilst highly ambitious, and one that will require foresight and drive to achieve would send out a positive signal to the community. **We hope the Tayside Fire Board will join with the Fire Brigades Union in setting a target of Zero Tolerance on fire deaths in Tayside.**

Appendix 1


The Relationship
Between
Fire Service
Response Times
And
The Risk of
Fire Fatality
Within
Tayside

Chart 1 shows the relationship between fire service average response times and the fire fatality rate per 1000 casualties. The response times are broken down into 5 bands;

1. 1 to 5 minutes
2. 6 to 10 minutes
3. 11 to 15 minutes
4. 16 to 20 minutes
5. 21 minutes and over

These five bands are constant in both charts.


Figures utilised are from Home Office (Entec UK Ltd) reports.



By selecting an average response time, the chart indicated the fire fatality rate per 1000 casualties, i.e. for the band 6 to 10 minutes a fatality rate of 41.2/1000 is recorded.

The important fact illustrated by this chart is that any increase in the response time of the fire service increases the risk of fire fatality. It should be noted that there is a marked increase in risk beyond 10 minutes.

Chart 2 illustrates the increased risk of fire fatality within Tayside.



The risk figure is based on the result from chart 1 being compared to the actual figures for fire casualties from Tayside Fire Brigade. The result is shown as (1 in X thousand) and is an individual's risk within the population of being a fire fatality based on the fire service response time. For example, taking band 2 (6 to 10 minutes) that person is at a 1 in 55,700 risk of becoming a fire fatality. At band four (16 to 20 minutes) their risk is now 1 in 25,300, considerably greater.

For information the Tayside average fire death rate over a period of years puts residents at a risk of 1 in 63,900. This is not broken down into response time bands but when compared to the national figures shows that residents in Tayside are a lower than local average risk if a fire appliance can reach them in 1 to 5 minutes, but are at greater than local average if the fire service takes longer to arrive.

It is important to note that with the Scottish best call handling time of an average of 51 seconds, Tayside Fire Brigade are likely to dispatch appliances quickly. Travel time and traffic congestion are the other main factors involved. However anything that extends the time from call to arrival of the brigade increases the risk of fire fatality.

Ref;

Entec UK Ltd – Response time fatality rate relationships for dwelling fires – Home Office 1999

Tayside Fire Brigade casualty rate 01/04/2003 to 31/03/2004

Tayside Fire Brigade fire death rate 1994/5 to 2003/4

Appendix 2

Critical Attendance Standards

The FBU expects the brigade to adopt an agreed 'Critical Attendance Standard' for operational incidents and to implement that throughout the brigade area. It will no longer be acceptable to assign insufficient appliances and crews to an incident simply because that incident occurs in a rural location.

Given that the brigade must work within parameters set by such things as, Health and Safety legislation, Incident Command and Control, Dynamic Risk Assessment, it is imperative that they provide sufficient crews and equipment within an acceptable time frame in order to efficiently deal with any incident.

For example, the recognised minimum attendance for a single domestic fire is nine fire fighters. This is based on breathing apparatus guidance, standard operating procedures, safe systems of work, command and control requirements and risk assessments. This is currently the accepted attendance for this type of incident within the cities in Tayside. Under a risk assessment based provision of fire cover, the dangers from fire within a domestic premise are the same whether the incident occurs in Dundee or Aberfeldy, therefore the provision of fire cover should be the same for persons living either in Dundee or Aberfeldy. And similarly the protection for fire fighters should also be the same.

An example of a Critical Attendance Standard (CAST) is included for information. Other examples are available in the FBU – IRMP National Document. (www.fbu.org.uk).

CAST 12

Single Occupancy

2 to 4 casualties involved rescue via internal staircase

Firefighting on ground floor. 2 – 4 casualties trapped on upper floor and visible on arrival. Initial entry via ground floor, and rescue via stairs

Task Sequence and Personnel Requirements		
1	Initial information gathering	1 x IC
2	General fire ground liaison	1 x IC
3	Incident command	1 x IC
4	Cause establishment	1 x IC
5	Provision of hose reel branch	2 x FF
6	Provision of hose reel branch	2 x FF
7	Provision of water from hydrant to pump/tank	2 x FF
8	BA Entry Control	1 x FF
9	Provision of water from pump/tank – high pressure pump	1 x FF
10	Gaining entry to premises with breaking in gear	2 x FF
11	Firefighting/Rescue 2 Firefighters BA – hose reel branch	2 x FF
12	Firefighting/Rescue 2 Firefighters BA – hose reel branch	2 x FF
13	Remove casualty to external opening – 2 x BA	2 x FF
14	Remove casualty to external opening – 2 x BA	2 x FF
15	Isolation of services	1 x FF
16	Remove casualty to place of safety	2 x FF
17	Remove casualty to place of safety	2 x FF
18	Ventilation of other areas – 2 x BA	2 x FF
19	Firefighting/Rescue 2 Firefighters BA – hose reel branch	2 x FF
20	Casualty treatment	2 x FF
21	Cutting away – 2 x BA	2 x FF
22	Liaison with ambulance	1 x IC
23	Ventilation of premises – fire compartment – 2 x BA	2 x FF
24	Salvage	2 x FF
25	Fireground servicing – 2 x BA	2 x FF
26	Turning over – BA – thermal imager	2 x FF
27	Damping down – 2 hose reel – 2 x BA	2 x FF
28	Debris/water removal – with salvage equipment	2 x FF
29	Fireground servicing – 6 x BA	6 x FF
30	Resource replenishment water	1 x FF
31	Make up equipment	1 x FF
32	Make up equipment	6 x FF
33	Debrief	1 x IC
1 Incident Command Role Firefighter & 8 Firefighters		9 TOTAL
EQUIPMENT		
70mm Hose x 3, BA Board – Complete x 1, BAECO Tabard x 1, Barriers/Cones/Tape x 1, Breaking in Gear x 1, Breathing Apparatus – Standard Duration x 6 (SDBA), First Aid Kit x 1, Hose Reel and Branch x 2, Hydrant Standpipe (Single) Key and Bar x 1, Pump with High Pressure Capability x 1, Radio Comms x 9, Resuscitator x 2, Salvage Equipment x 2, SDBA – Spare Cylinder x 8, Set of Hose Ramps x 2, Small Gear x 2, Specialist First Aid Equipment x 1, Thermal Imager x 1, Turning Over Tools x 1, Water Tank – 1800 Litres x 1.		

Resources

For further information contact

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Fire Brigades Union Scotland

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Fire Brigades Union

www.fbu.org.uk

The FBU National IRMP document is available from
www.fbu.org.uk

To see the Tayside Fire Brigade document, go to
www.taysidefire.gov.uk

Further copies of this document are available from
www.fbutayside.org.uk

Copies of supplementary responses are available from
www.fbutayside.org.uk